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Collateral consequences of criminal conviction—
the legal instruments which emanate from the 
conviction and limit offenders’ rights beyond those 
already constrained by punishment—are increasingly 
being identified as an important source of offenders’ 
hardship. Although it ultimately depends on individual 
perception and personal circumstances, it is reasonable 
to suggest that ‘the greatest effect of [crime 
conviction] will not be imprisonment, but being 
marked as a criminal and subjected to collateral 
consequences’ (Chin, 2017, p. 1). This claim resonates 
particularly well with U.S. practices, a problem that 
Chin and other authors (Pinard, 2010; Love, 2011) 
clearly expose. While there are slightly more than 9 
million Americans who are currently either 
imprisoned, under probation, or on parole, it is 
estimated that more than 77 million have criminal 
records (Friedman, 2015) and are thus enduring at 
least some collateral consequences. To mention briefly 
the main conclusions of studies carried out in the 
United States over the past couple of decades, 
collateral consequences are rising in number and 
targeting a broadening area of convicts’ private and 
social lives; they are oftentimes invisible since the 
offenders are unaware of the possibility of their 
imposition and they frequently last a lifetime 
(Olivares, Burton, & Cullen, 1996; Uggen, Manza, & 
Thompson, 2006). 
Taking these findings into consideration, the ease 
with which such measures are oftentimes administered 
and the lack of justification for their imposition is 
striking. The legal stance taken in the United States is 
that collateral consequences are not punishment, but 
constitute regulatory measures—as such they do not 
fall under the Eighth Amendment protection against 
cruel and unusual punishment (Chin, 2017, citing 
Byrne v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2015; 
People v. Rizzo, 2016; State v. Meadows, 2014). But if 
their nature is not penal, some other theoretical ground 
for their imposition must exist—they should not be 
administered unless their aims are clear and legitimate. 
From the many recommendations for reform of 
the system of collateral consequences in the United 
States that Chin proposes (Chin, 2017), this comment 
will focus on one: the proposal to reduce the number 
of collateral consequences by retaining only those that 
promote public safety. Chin argues that collateral 
consequences should only follow those crimes that 
“present elevated risks to public safety” or “particular 
danger to be avoided”; furthermore, “blanket” 
 COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: LIMITS & JUSTIFICATIONS 19 
Criminology, Criminal Justice, Law & Society – Volume 18, Issue 3 
restrictions ought to be avoided and we should aim to 
disqualify on a “case-by-case basis, looking at the 
relevant facts and circumstances” (Chin, 2017, p. 2).  
If consistently applied, Chin’s argument would 
reduce collateral consequences to the so-called 
“security measures,” a form of legal sanctions 
regularly applied in many European jurisdictions. 
German criminal law, for example, provides for a 
number of sanctions that can be imposed along 
criminal punishment if a risk is present that the 
perpetrator will reoffend—the most important in this 
context concern the revocation of driving licence and 
prohibition to engage in a profession (GERMAN PENAL 
CODE §§ 69-69b, 70-70b). Security measures can 
therefore be imposed if two conditions are satisfied: 
 
1. there is a clear link between the perpetrated 
crime and the sanction – the criminal act 
targeted by the sanction needs to constitute a 
breach of special obligations or norms that 
regulate the performance of specific activities 
(for instance, norms that prescribe how a 
physician ought to perform her job, or norms 
that determine parental duties); and 
 
2. there is an expectation (‘estimate of risk’) that 
the perpetrator will reoffend unless the sanction 
is imposed.  
 
Looking at the extensive list of collateral 
consequences in the United States (see Chin, 2017; 
Pinard, 2010; Uggen et al., 2006), it seems that some 
could plausibly be retained by using the “risk” or 
“danger to public safety” criterion—sanctions such as 
banning an offender from certain professions, 
depriving her of the right to keep or bear arms, losing 
custody of one’s children, driving restrictions, 
prohibitions to obtain government licenses, and so on. 
In all these cases, it is plausible that these sanctions are 
necessary to reduce the risk or danger to individuals or 
the public. Two caveats should accompany this 
proposition—these collateral consequences would 
need to satisfy the two criteria developed above and, 
as Chin himself emphasizes, they should not be 
imposed in a blanket manner, but upon careful 
consideration of the facts of the case. While there is 
always a danger of over-inclusiveness when 
estimating risk, the danger greatly diminishes if the 
decision is made in line with suggestions spelled-out 
above. 
Although the risk-based criterion for determining 
the justifiability of collateral consequences provides 
grounds for retaining some of the sanctions currently 
applied in the United States, it also makes many others 
redundant. If Chin’s suggestion is applied diligently, 
these sanctions should be discarded. But could it be 
that Chin’s proposal is under-inclusive? Are there 
reasons other than risk which could justify the 
existence of such collateral consequences? 
By taking risk as the only justified reason to 
impose collateral consequences, Chin essentially 
suggests that all collateral consequences (should) have 
the same legal nature: the only way to understand and 
justify them is to perceive them as sanctions which 
purport to incapacitate dangerous offenders by 
removing crime-enabling tools or situations. But 
incapacitation need not be the only penal aim they 
could be pursuing—other penal and even non-penal 
aims could also be considered legitimate. Although it 
is true that collateral consequences are exceptionally 
diverse and eclectic, and even if there seems to be 
“little conscious policy” behind them (Damaska, 1968, 
p. 347), this does not necessarily mean that they cannot 
be justified, if not as a group of similar sanctions, then 
each in its own vein.  
A helpful way to understand such sanctions is to 
try to comprehend what each of them targets. By 
employing this approach, we can observe that 
collateral consequences aim at diverse components of 
offenders’ private and social lives. Subsequently, we 
can divide them into three groups—those that target 
civil, political, or social rights (Demleitner, 1999; 
Uggen et al., 2006). The distinction is important 
because by looking at the domain that they impact, we 
may to some extent infer why this domain is targeted. 
Although this falls substantively short of validating the 
sanction, it does at least provide a frame within which 
we can look for justifications. 
In this sense, collateral consequences that target 
the civil component of one’s status—the most 
important of which concern prohibitions to engage in 
a profession or the right of employers to obtain records 
on previous convictions—clearly seek to remove 
“unsuitable” (potential) workers. The estimate of risk 
is, of course, crucial here—a physician who 
malpractices or a pilot who intentionally endangers the 
safety of a flight would clearly qualify for these 
restrictions. However, there could be reasons other 
than those of risk which could justify such sanctions—
holding a public office, such as being a judge or a 
prosecutor—may warrant excluding people with 
previous convictions (or previous convictions of 
specific kind) to secure that these offices are occupied 
by individuals whose moral qualities cannot be 
doubted a priori. Although we can certainly debate the 
normative desirability of such restrictions, we cannot 
deny that judges and prosecutors ought to have 
specific moral qualities and that some instruments to 
secure this need to be in place. 
When it comes to collateral consequences that 
target the political component of one’s status—these 
most notably pertain to criminal disenfranchisement 
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and the ability to serve on jury—their apparent aim is 
to sanction offenders in their role as members of self-
governing political communities. Estimates of risk or 
danger seem to fare badly as justifications for such 
sanctions. What kind of danger do we avert by 
preventing an offender from voting or being on the 
jury? What harm would the expression of their opinion 
in these situations cause? But again, there may be 
reasons other than those of risk for imposing such 
sanctions. A polity, for example, may decide that it no 
longer wishes to extend rights of full political 
participation to those that have wronged it gravely. A 
U.S. example is pertinent here—was the United States 
not justified in removing electoral rights, and thus 
denouncing as a bad citizen, Timothy McVeigh who, 
in the 1995 Oklahoma bombing, killed 168 of his co-
citizens? A comparison with European criminal 
disenfranchisement practices may also provide some 
context. A recent study uncovered that approximately 
three-quarters of European democracies employ some 
sort of electoral ban (Tripkovic, 2016). Looking at 
specific policies, one finds little evidence that they 
were devised with estimates of risk in mind; they 
rather seem to be reproaching various kinds of 
criminals for their apparent lack of desirable 
citizenship qualities. In terms of criminal offenders 
whose rights are removed, all countries may be 
divided into three groups:  
 
1. those that target serious offenders by providing 
restrictions only for those imprisoned or 
imprisoned for a particular time;  
 
2. those that pertain to “bad” offenders by 
reserving restrictions only for those who have 
perpetrated “immoral” or “dishonorable” 
crimes; and 
 
3. those that concern “subversive” offenders by 
disenfranchising offenders sentenced for 
“political” or “anti-state” crimes (Tripkovic, 
2016).  
 
European countries thus seem to have a clear idea why 
they disenfranchise particular groups of convicts—and 
as it can be seen from this brief overview, such reasons 
are not connected to the estimate of risk, at least not 
risk to public safety. Again, as in the case of sanctions 
that target civil rights, we may debate the legitimacy 
of restricting political rights to downgrade one’s 
citizenship status, but we cannot in principle deny that 
citizens have duties towards their polities and that 
some (even if not these) sanctions could viably be 
imposed for failing to perform these duties. 
Finally, collateral consequences that impact on 
social rights—most importantly, restricting access to 
welfare programs such as public housing, as well as to 
grants and loans—seem to target offenders that are 
considered unworthy of benefits that are intended to 
improve one’s welfare. Imposing such restrictions 
severely impacts one’s well-being. Yet, it seems that 
at least some of them may be justified by citing risk 
concerns. For example, preventing convicted drug 
offenders from living in public housing can reduce 
security risks associated with drug abuse which is a 
long-standing problem in such dwellings (Bryson & 
Youmans, 1990). Other reasons for the imposition of 
restrictions to social rights, however, seem more 
difficult to find than in the case of sanctions targeting 
the civil and political rights domain. This is mostly 
because restrictions to this area target an important and 
vulnerable part of offenders’ lives as well as their 
propensity to secure conditions for the satisfaction of 
their everyday needs. It does seem that, in this domain, 
Chin’s suggestion should not be considered under-
inclusive. 
The “risk to public safety” and the “danger to be 
avoided” therefore provide reasonable grounds for 
imposing many of the contemporary collateral 
consequences as Chin proposes. It is, furthermore, 
particularly significant that these grounds cut across 
distinctions between restrictions to various citizenship 
domains thus providing a solitary justification for their 
imposition. Nevertheless, as I have tried to 
demonstrate, there may be other possibly legitimate 
reasons to impose some of the collateral consequences 
that exist today. Although this short comment could 
only refer to a few such examples rather than build a 
defensible theory, this approach suggests that risk may 
not be the only valid justification for the existence of 
non-punitive sanctions. The examples prompt us to 
acknowledge that various collateral consequences may 
have diverse legal nature and to think imaginatively 
about their aims and justifications. 
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